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Origins of
the Cold War, Part One,1917-1945
1
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3 4 5
6 7 8
9 10 12 13 14 15 16 p.11
Without consultation
with Chiang Kai-shek, the Western Allies agree that USSR will jointly
operate the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria with China and
that USSR will have a predominant interest in Dairen, Manchuria's
chief port.
Stalin is given permission to use the labor of German prisoners
of war as part of the reparations due the USSR.
[FDR has been bitterly criticized by the Republicans ever since
for "giving away" Eastern Europe and the Far East to Stalin.
The fact is that the Red Army had already occupied all of what would
be called the "Eastern bloc" with the exception of Czechoslovakia
and the Allies had not yet reached the Rhine in the west. FDR made
concessions to Stalin in the Far East to achieve a promise to enter
the war against Japan. This was at a time when the Americans were
experiencing heavy casualties in the Pacific, each island being
won at great cost and the atom bomb was five months away from being
tested. Chiang Kai-shek later approved of the deal FDR had made,
and the Sino-Soviet treaty signed in August formalized the agreement
of the two governments. American public opinion was quite favorable
to the results of the Yalta Conference; only 9% of Americans felt
the agreements reached at Yalta would be unfavorable to the United
States.] (43)
Notes
and Sources
February 25, 1945
Allen Dulles, the head
of the OSS in Bern, Switzerland, is contacted by an Italian businessman
and a Swiss schoolmaster about the possibility of opening a channel
for the unconditional surrender of the German troops in the Southern
front. [The Germans were losing the war, a fact obvious to everyone
but Hitler. Various peace feelers had been made since November,
many of them from Himmler offering a joint war against the Soviet
Union. The approach made to Dulles began a series of meetings and
negotiations code-named Operation Sunrise that culminated two months
later in the surrender of the German and Italian fascist forces
signed on April 29th. (Dulles would become director of the CIA 1953-1961.)
(44) ]
February 28, 1945
Andrei Vishinsky, Soviet
deputy commissar for foreign affairs, meets with the King of Rumania,
gives him two hours to dismiss the current fascist government of
General Radescu and to form one more to the liking of the USSR.
[King Michael was forced to accept the Popular Front government
of Peter Groza. There was little or no disagreement from the West.
The government had been one of the most repressive in Europe, and
their peasants some of the most poverty-stricken. And, according
to Fleming, "the Soviets were doing in Rumania what Churchill
had already done in Greece, with more justification and with little
bloodshed."] (45)
March 12, 1945
Soviet Foreign Minister
Molotov, having been informed of the prospective meeting in Switzerland
of an American and a British general with German military as part
of the Operation Sunrise maneuvers, tells Ambassador Harriman that
the Soviet government has no objection to the talks but wishes to
have three Soviet officers at the meetings. [This request is refused
on the grounds that the talks are only exploratory and Soviet participation
would delay the proceedings. And since the proposal was for a surrender
on the Anglo-American front, the Americans and British should be
the ones responsible for the negotiations just as the Soviets were
in charge of German surrenders on the Russian front. An angry exchange
of notes followed in which Molotov accused the Americans and British
of negotiating "behind the back of the Soviet government which
is bearing the brunt of the war against Germany" and threatened
to boycott the United Nations organizational meeting in San Francisco.
On April 3rd Stalin sent a long letter to FDR accusing the Americans
and British of having promised "to ease the Armistice terms
for the Germans" in exchange for their opening up the front
and allowing the Allies to "move to the east". He semi-apologized
after receiving an indignant reply from FDR who told him: "I
cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment toward your informers,
whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions
or those of my trusted subordinates."] (46)
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